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(II)

THE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

The Claimant was the prevailing party before the Industrial Commission at both the
9.28.10 Hearing and at the 5.17 .12 Hearing. As the prevailing party, the Claimant is entitled to
have all facts and inferences in the record viewed in his favor on appeal:
This Court views all facts and inferences "in the light most favorable to the party
who prevailed before the Commission." Taylor v. Soran Rest., Inc., 131 Idaho 525,
527, 950 P .2d 1254, 1256 (1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Page v.
lvfcCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 305, 179 P.3d. 265, 268 (2008).
The Idaho Supreme Court can only set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law
in the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 and 12.5.12 decisions if it finds that the standards ofldaho
Code §72-732 have been met:
In reviewing decisions of the Industrial Commission on appeal to this Court, Idaho
Code section 72-732 sets forth the standard of review. This Court may affirm or set
aside an order or award made by the Commission, " or may set it aside only
upon the following grounds: (1) the commission's findings of fact are not based on
any substantial competent evidence; (2) the commission has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; (3) the findings of fact, order or award were
procured by fraud; (4) the findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order
or award." LC. § 72-732; Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138 Idaho 343, 345-46, 63 P.3d 469,
471-72 (2003). Magee v. Thompson Creek Min. Co., 152 Idaho 196, 200, 268 P.3d
464, 468 (2012) (emphasis supplied).
The Employer's appeal of the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 decision and 12.5.12
decision is limited to the grounds set forth in Idaho Code §72-732(1) and (4). Under Idaho Code
§72-732(1), the only relevant question on appeal is whether the Commission's findings of fact
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were based on any substantial competent evidence. This Court has defined substantial and
competent evidence as follows:
Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion. Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho
733, 735, 40 P.3d 91, 93 (2002). Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., p. 5, Docket
No. 39337, Filed June 4, 2013.
The only finding of fact in the 5.17.11 decision that Employer has challenged on appeal
was clearly supported by substantial and competent evidence and should be affirmed on appeal.
(III)
(1)

ARGUMENT

EMPLOYER FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE NOT SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY IDAHO
CODE §72-732(1)

On 4.24.13 Employer filed its 46 page Appellant's Brief. The only finding of fact in the
Commission's 5.17.11 decision that Employer challenged in its 4.24.13 Brief pursuant to Idaho
Code §72-732(1) was the following:
There is no dispute that Claimant suffered an accident and injury on December 18,
2009, as those terms are defined in Idaho Code§§ 72-102 (18)(a)(b) and (c), and that
the accident causing the injury occurred during the course of Claimant's
employment. The question is whether his accident and injury arose out of his
employment (R., Vol. I, p. 35, LL 9-12).
Employer challenged that finding of fact with the following assignment of error:
In this case, the Industrial commission erred by asserting UPS did not dispute an
accident or injury as defined in Idaho Code §72-102(18) had occurred (See p. 17, LL
8-9 of Employer's 4.24.13 Appellant's Brief).
When the Claimant filed his 5.22.13 Respondent's Brief, he emphasized that Employer
had only challenged a single finding of fact in its appeal of the Industrial Commission's
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5.17.11 decision (See p. 22, LL 20-22 of Claimant's 5.22.13 Respondent's Brief). When
Employer filed its 6.19.13 Reply Brief, Employer did not dispute that it only challenged this
single finding of fact in the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 decision. Given this record, the
only inquiry that the Court is required to make under Idaho Code §72-732(1) is whether the
single finding of fact challenged by Employer was supported by substantial and competent
evidence? The following discussion leaves no doubt that the single finding of fact challenged by
Employer on appeal was supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Employer argues that because it denied this claim on the exclusive ground that Claimant's
low back injury did not "arise out of his employment" as required by Idaho Code §72102(18)(a), that denial would automatically include the totally different denials that the Claimant
was not involved in an "accident" on 12.18.09 as that term of art is defined by Idaho Code §72102(18)(b); the denial that the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident did not "cause" his low back injury
as required by Idaho Code §72-102(18)(a), (b) and (c) and the denial that the Claimant did not
suffer a low back "injury" as required by Idaho Code §72-102(18)(a), (b) and (c).
It follows that to dispute whether an accident and injury arose out of a worker's
employment includes a dispute of the occurrence of an accident and injury as defined
in Idaho Code §72-102(18) (Seep. 1, Ll. 7-9 of Employer's 6.19.13 Reply Brief).

Employer asks this Court to believe that it discussed the "accident" issue, the "causation"
issue and the "injury" issue at length in its 12.17 .10 post-hearing brief:
In UPS's post-hearing brief, it asserted Respondent had 'failed to prove his injury
was the result of an accident arising out of his employment' and discussed the issue
at length (Seep. 1, LL 19-21 of Employer's 6.19.13 Reply Brief).
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Employer's argument is misleading and totally contradicted by the information in
Employer's 12.17.10 post-hearing brief. A careful review of pages 12-20 of the Employer's
12.17.10 post-hearing brief confirms that Employer focused all of its arguments on the "arise out
of employment" issue and conceded the "accident" issue, the "causation" issue and the "injury"
issue by failing to devote even a single sentence of legal argument disputing those issues.
•

Employer did not argue that Claimant was not involved in an accident because he was not
involved in an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event as
required by §72-102(18)(c).

•

Employer did not argue that Claimant's accident was not connected with the industry in
which it occurs as required by §72-102(18)(c).

•

Employer did not argue that Claimant's accident could not be reasonably located as to
time when and place where it occurred as required by §72-102(18)(c).

•

Employer did not argue that Claimant's accident did not cause his injury as required by
§72-102(18)(a), (b) and (c).

•

Employer did not argue that Claimant did not suffer an mJury as required by §72102(18)(a), (b) and (c).
Since Employer failed to even discuss the "accident" issue, the "causation" issue and the

"injury" issue in its 12.17.10 post-hearing brief, the Commission correctly found that:
There is no dispute that Claimant suffered an accident and injury on December 18,
2009, as those terms are defined in Idaho Code§§ 72-102 (18)(a)(b) and (c), and that
the accident causing the injury occurred during the course of Claimant's
employment. The question is whether his accident and injury arose out of his
employment (R., Vol. I, p. 35, LL 9-12).
Even though Employer completely failed to analyze and dispute these issues in its 12.17.10
post-hearing brief, Employer asks this Court to reverse the Industrial Commission's finding that
Employer did not dispute those issues at the 9.28.10 Hearing based on nothing more than a
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generic listing of those issues in its Answer to the Complaint and in its Response to Claimant's

Request For Calendaring (Seep. 1, LL 10-19 of Employer's 6.19.13 Reply Brief).
This Court should reject Employer's argument and affirm the Industrial Commission's
finding of fact that Employer did not dispute those issues because the mere listing of disputed
issues in a pleading or brief without supporting argument and citation to controlling legal
authority is not sufficient to dispute the issue either before the Industrial Commission or this
Court:
We will not consider an issue not "supported by argument and authority in the
opening brief." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454
(2008); see also Idaho App. R. 35(a)(6) ("The argument shall contain the contentions
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor,
with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied
upon."). Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party's brief as
one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not
supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this
Court. Inama v. Boise County ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d
450, 456 (2003) (refusing to address a constitutional takings issue when the issue
was not supported by legal authority and was only mentioned in passing).
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and to
support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too
indefinite to be heard by the Court. Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65,
68 (1975). A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district court,
without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an
issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445, 263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court
will not search the record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof! Discipline,
138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003). Consequently, to the extent that an
assignment of error is not argued and supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is
deemed to be waived. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005).
Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). The Court also
held that it would not consider any issues "lacking in coherence, citations to the
record, citations of applicable authority, or comprehensible argument.. .. " Id. at 791,
229 P.3d at 1153. Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, _ 297
P.3d 1134, 1140, (2013).
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Since Employer failed to present any cogent argument with proper citation to applicable
legal authorities in its 12.17.10 post-hearing brief, the Commission correctly found that
Employer did not dispute the "accident" issue, the "causation" issue, the "injury" issue and the
"in the course of employment" issue. Employer does not have the right to argue those disputed
issues for the first time on appeal:
This Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Obenchain
v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443, 444 (2006) Allen v.
Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008).
Employer now attempts to transfer responsibility for its failure to dispute these issues to
the Claimant by arguing that he failed to meet his burden of proving each element in the prima
facie case for an accident I injury claim:
Essentially, unless a party formally stipulates to concede an issue, the party with the
burden of proof is not relieved of its duty to establish a prima facie case (See p. 2, LL
16-17 of Employer's 6.19 .13 Reply Brief).
Employer cannot make this argument for the first time on appeal Allen v. Reynolds, 145
Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008). Even if the Court were inclined to entertain this
veiled request for summary judgment on appeal, the Court should reject this argument since the
record before the Industrial Commission contained substantial and competent evidence to
support the Commission's finding that the Claimant had met his burden of proving each element
in the prima facie case for an accident I injury claim

1
•

The Claimant respectfully requests that

the Court affirm the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 finding that Employer did not dispute that

1

See citations to the record at pp. 3-7 of CL. 11.19 .10 post-hearing brief which support the Commission's prima facie case findings.
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Claimant suffered an "accident" "in the course" of his employment which "caused" his low back
"injury" because Employer failed to meet its burden of proof under Idaho Code §72-732(1 ).
(2)

EMPLOYER FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT DID NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW
SUPPORT ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE CLAIMANT'S INJURY
"AROSE OUT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT" AS REQUIRED BY IDAHO CODE §72732(4)

The Claimant argued at pages 24-27 of his 5.22.13 Reply Brief that Employer had
completely failed to meet its burden of proof pursuant to Idaho Code §72-732( 4) because it did
not identify a single finding of fact from the Commission's 5.17 .11 decision in its 4.24.13
Appellant's Brief which did not as a matter of law support the Industrial Commission's ruling
that the Claimant's injury arose out of his employment.
After the Claimant put the Employer on notice of this fatal flaw in the Employer's Idaho
Code §72-73 2(4) argument for appealing the Industrial Commission's decision, the Employer
did not make any attempt in its 6.19.13 Reply Brief to cure this defect by specifically

identifying those findings of fact in the Commission's 5.17 .11 decision which did not, as a
matter of law, support the Commission's 5.17 .11 ruling that the Claimant's injury arose out of
his employment. This Court has held that it will not search the record on appeal and identify
assignments of error where the appellant has failed to identify the assignments of error with
particularity. A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the Industrial Commission
without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue.
Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317,

297

P.3d

1134,

1140

(2013).

Employer has made nothing but a general and conclusory attack on the Commission's decision:
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The Industrial Commission's use of the positional risk doctrine given its findings
was in error, and its 2011 Decision warrants reversal. (ER. 4.24.13 App. Br., p. 33,
LL 7-8).

Employer failed to address the Claimant's Idaho Code §72-732(4) arguments and did not
identify any disputed findings of fact in the Commission's 5.17.11 decision which did not, as a
matter of law, support the Commission's ruling that the Claimant's injury arose out of
employment because the Commission's findings of fact supported its legal conclusion that the
Claimant's injury arose out of his employment 2.
Based on Employer's failure to identify any findings of fact with particularity which did
not, as a matter of law, support the Commission's ruling that the Claimant's injury arose out of
his employment, the Court should rule that the Employer has either waived its Idaho Code §72732(4) grounds for appeal or failed to meet its burden of proving that the Commission's decision
should be set aside pursuant to requirements of that code section.
(3)

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT EMPLOYER PRESENTED SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO REBUT THE PREMISES PRESUMPTION BECAUSE THAT
RULING WAS BASED ON THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD AND NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD

When the Claimant asked this Court to reverse the Industrial Commission's erroneous
conclusion that Employer had come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the premises
presumption, the Claimant based his request for a reversal of that ruling on the following 6
assignments of error:

2

See citation to the Industrial Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth at pp. 24-27 of Claimant's 5.22.13 Respondent's
Brief.
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1.

The Commission committed plain legal error by applying the wrong legal
standard for what an Employer is required to prove to rebut the premises
presumption in direct violation of this Court's holding in Foust v. Birds Eye Div.,
91Idaho418, 419, 422 P.2d 616, 617 (1967);

2.

The Commission failed to cite any evidence in the record to support its conclusion
that Employer came forward with sufficient evidence to permit reasonable minds
to conclude that the subject accident was not one arising out of employment;

3.

The Commission failed to cite any legal authority for its legal conclusion that
Employer could rebut the premises presumption by having a "reasonable
expectation" that the Claimant would arrive on his Employer's premises with his
boot laces already pre-tied;

4.

The Employer could not have formed a "reasonable expectation" that the
Claimant would arrive on his Employer's premises with his boot laces pre-tied
because Employer did not have any written policy, procedure, standard, rule or
guideline which told the Claimant that he was required to arrive on his
Employer's premises with his boot laces pre-tied;

5.

The Commission failed to cite any legal authority for its legal conclusion that
Employer could rebut the premises presumption by arguing that the risk which
caused the Claimant's injury was a "common risk with no particular association to
the Claimant's employment"; and,

6.

The Commission's finding that Claimant was exposed to a "common risk with no
particular association with Claimant's employment" was contradicted by the
Commission's own subsequent findings (See pp. 15 - 22 of Claimant's 5.22.13
Respondent's Brief).

The Claimant's first assignment of error is the most important one because if the Court
agrees with Claimant that it was plain error for the Commission to not apply the Foust standard
for what an Employer must prove to overcome the premises presumption, then all other
assignments of error will be moot. Employer argues that the Claimant's reliance on the Foust
standard is erroneous because it ignores the plain language of I.R.E. 301:
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Respondent's argument the Industrial Commission committed legal error because it
did not apply the 'Foust standard' is erroneous and ignores the plain language of
I.R.E. 301 (Seep. 6, LL 25-26 of ER. 6.19.13 Reply Brief).
Employer's argument is both ironic and misleading since it is the Employer who has
blatantly ignored the operative language of I.R.E. 301. As pointed out the Claimant in his
5.22.13 Respondent's Brief, by its express terms, the plain language of I.R.E. 301 clearly
indicates that the presumption standards of the rule only apply in those cases where an Idaho
appellate decision has not already defined the presumption standard:
Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Proceedings. (a) Effect. In all
civil actions and proceedings, unless otherwise provided for by statute, !!y
Idaho appellate decisions or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to
rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of
proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the
trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast. The burden of going
forward is satisfied by the introduction of evidence sufficient to permit
reasonable minds to conclude that the presumed fact does not exist. If the
party against whom a µ_resumption operates fails to meet the burden of
going forward, the presumed fact shall be deemed proved. If the party
meets the burden of going forward, no instruction on the presumption shall be
given, and the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the
presumed fact without regard to the presumption (emphasis supplied).
The seminal Idaho appellate decision which has always defined the premises presumption
and described the type of evidence that the Employer must come forward with in order to
overcome the legal effect of the presumption is Foust v. Birds Eye Div., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P .2d
616 (1967):
A contrary presumption, that is, that the injury arises out of and in the course of
employment, prevails where the injury occurs on the employer's premises, as in the
instant case and Nichols v. Godfrey, supra. (citations omitted). In the case at bar
there is nothing to indicate that respondent, while on her employer's premises, was
engaged in any abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to her employment, as was
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the situation in In re Malmquist, 78 Idaho 117, 300 P.2d 820 (1956); Neale v.
Weaver, 60 Idaho 41, 88 P.2d 522 (1939); and Walker v. Hyde, 43 Idaho 625, 253 P.
1104 (1927). Id. 91Idaho418, 419, 422 P.2d 616, 617 (1967).
The Foust standard clearly defines the type of evidence that that Employer must come
forward with in order to overcome the premises presumption. If the Employer fails to present
sufficient evidence that the Claimant was engaged in some abnormal unforeseeable activity on
his employer's premises that was foreign to his employment at the time of his accident I injury,
then Employer has failed to meet the Foust standard for rebutting the presumption and the
Claimant is entitled to the benefit of the presumption; i.e., his injury must be deemed to arise out
of his employment as a matter of law.
Thirty (30) years after this Court established the Foust standard for what an Employer
must prove to overcome the legal effect of the premises presumption, this Court revisited the
premises presumption in Kessler on Behalf of Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 859,
934 P.2d 28, 32 (1997):
We also recognize that, when an injury occurs on an employer's premises, a
presumption that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment arises.
Foust v. Birds Eye Div., 91 Idaho 418, 419, 422 P.2d 616, 617 (1967). Because
Kessler died at the Payette County Sheriffs office, this presumption clearly applies,
and, therefore, the SIF had the burden of producing evidence indicating that Kessler's
injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. I.R.E. 301. See also
Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 478, 849 P.2d 934, 939 (1993). Kessler on
Behalf of Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 859, 934 P.2d 28, 32 (1997).
Even though the Kessler Court did not expressly or impliedly overrule Foust when it
referred to I.R.E. 301, the Industrial Commission and the Employer have both interpreted the
Kessler Court's reference to I.R.E. 301 as an expression of the Court's intent to overrule Foust

and lower the standard for what an Employer must prove to rebut the premises presumption:
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Since its decision in Foust, the Supreme Court has not recognized Respondent's socalled 'Foust standard' regarding the required standard of going forward, but has
instead followed the rule set forth in I.R.E. 301. See Kessler, 129 Idaho at 859, 934
P.2d at 32 ... (Seep. 7, LL 10-13 of Employer's 6.19.13 Reply Brief).
Therefore, in order to overcome the presumption that the accident is one arising out
of and in the course of employment, Defendant must come forward with proof
sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the accident is not one arising
out of and in the course of employment (R. Vol. 1, p. 37, LL 17-20).
The Industrial Commission and the Employer have both taken the position that the Kessler
Court's bald citation to I.R.E. 301 can only mean that the Foust standard no longer applies and
the Employer no longer has to prove that the Claimant was engaged in some abnormal
unforeseeable act on his employer's premises that was completely foreign to his employment in
order to overcome the legal effect of the premises presumption. The Court should reject this
interpretation of Kessler and reverse the Industrial Commission's refusal to apply the Foust
standard for the following reasons:
1.

The Kessler Court cited Foust with approval as the seminal case which still defined
the premises presumption standards 30 years after Foust was decided;

2.

The Kessler Court merely cited I.R.E. 301 without analysis or discussion and did not
expressly or impliedly hold that its reference to I.R.E. 301 was intended to supersede,
replace, overrule or lower the Foust standards;

3.

By its express terms, I.R.E. 301 only defines the presumption and rebuttal standards
in those cases where no Idaho appellate decisions have already defined the applicable
standards. Since Foust already defined the presumption rebuttal standards 30 years
before the Kessler Court's citation to I.R.E. 301, the Foust standards still control; and,

4.

This Court has construed the premises presumption standards from Foust, Kessler and
I.R.E. 301 as being perfectly compatible and not mutually exclusive as evidenced by
this Court's recent citation to both Foust and Kessler as the seminal cases which still
define the premises presumption standards:
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When an injury occurs on an employer's premises, a presumption arises that the
injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Kessler, 129 Idaho at 859,
934 P.2d at 32 (1997); Foust v. Birds Eye Div., 91 Idaho 418, 419, 422 P.2d
616, 617 (1967). Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 333, 179
P.3d 288, 296 (2008).
Since this Court's holdings in Foust, Kessler and Stevens-McAtee and the language of
l.R.E. 301 all deal with the standards which govern application of the premises presumption, the
Court should construe its holdings as being consistent with the language of I.R.E. 301 whenever
possible:
Where statutes are in pari materia (relating to the same subject matter), they
should be construed together to give effect to legislative intent. Dewey v. Merrill,
124 Idaho 201, 204, 858 P.2d 740, 743 (1993). State, Dep't of Health Welfare ex
rel. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho 776, 779, 890 P. 2d 727, 730 (1995).
If this Court construes its holding in Foust, Kessler and Stevens-McAtee as being

consistent with the language of I.R.E. 301, the Court should hold that in order to overcome the
premises presumption, the Employer must come forward with sufficient evidence to prove that
the Claimant was engaged in some abnormal unforeseeable activity on his employer's premises
that was foreign to his employment at the time he suffered an injury. If the Employer fails to
present this type of evidence, then reasonable minds could not conclude that the Employer has
presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption "and the presumed fact [that the
Claimant's injury arose out of his employment] shall be deemed proved" (I.R.E. 301).
The overwhelming evidence in this case proves that the Claimant was performing an act
required by his Employer's safety policies or reasonably incidental to the performance of his job
duties when he bent over to tie the laces on his work boots on 12.18.09 and suffered his low back
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injury

3

•

Since there was no evidence in the record that Employer could rely on to meet the

Foust standard and overcome the legal effect of the premises presumption, the Commission was

forced to apply the wrong legal standard based on the Kessler's Court's reference to I.R.E. 301.
All of this legal maneuvering became necessary because Employer denied this claim on the
exclusive legal ground that the Claimant's injury did not arise out of his employment (CL.

5.17.12. EX. 8; EX. 9, 009006). If the Foust standard controlled, the Commission would have
no choice but to give the Claimant the benefit of the premises presumption and rule that the
Claimant's injury arose out of his employment as a matter of law because there was no evidence
in the record that the Claimant was engaged in some abnormal unforeseeable act foreign to his
employment when he bent over to tie his work boot laces on his Employer's premises on
12.18.09.
This is exactly how Referee Powers decided the case and there was no need to go any
further and accept the Employer's invitation to review 80 +years of "employment risk" versus
"personal risk" versus "neutral risk" versus "equal risk" versus "common risk" versus "positional
risk" case law on the "arise out of employment" issue (R., Vol. I, pp. 20-31 ).
The Industrial Commission must have realized that if it properly applied the Foust standard
for what is required to overcome the premises presumption, that would be dispositive of this
entire case and render moot all of Employer's "greater risk" arguments on the "arise out of
employment" issue.

Of course, if this case had been decided early based on the proper

application of the Foust standards, that would deprive Employer of the opportunity to use this
3

See discussion and citations to the record set forth at pages 15-22 of Claimant's 5.22. 13 Respondent's Brief.
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case on appeal to attempt to convince this Court that it should overrule its prior rejection of the
"greater risk" doctrine in Spivey v. Novartis Seed, 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002).
Since the Commission evidently wanted this Court to revisit its rationale for its rejection of
the "greater risk" doctrine in Spivey, the Commission had to reject Referee Powers' proper
application of the Foust premises presumption standards (R., Vol. I, pp. 23 - 28) and find that
Employer had presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption based on a lower
standard that the Commission fashioned from the Kessler Court's mere reference to I.R.E. 301.
This Court should reverse the Commission's refusal to apply the Foust standards to the
premises presumption and hold that Foust, Kessler and I.R.E. 301 presumption standards are all
compatible and required Employer to prove that the Claimant was engaged in some abnormal
unforeseeable act on his employer's premises that was completely foreign to his employment at
the time he suffered his injury in order to overcome the legal effect of the premises presumption.
The Industrial Commission and the Employer have also tried to avoid application of the

Foust standard by misreading dicta from Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572,
990 P.2d 738 (1999):
Even so, the mere fact that an injury occurs on the employer's premises is not an
exclusive test for compensability, but rather is only one factor to be considered. In re
Malmquist, 78 Idaho 117, 3 00 P .2d 820 (1956). To establish that the accident arose
out of and in the course of employment, the fact that an injury occurs on the
employer's premises must be accompanied by a showing of a causal connection
between the conditions existing on the employer's premises and the accident
involved. Nichols v. Godfrey, 90 Idaho 345, 350, 411 P.2d 763, 765 (1966). See also
Kessler, supra, 129 Idaho at 860, 934 P.2d at 31. (R. Vol. I, p. 38, LL 5-12).
The Industrial Commission interpreted the dicta from Dinius as follows:
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Foust creates a presumption that an accident occurring on employer's premises arises
out of and is in the course of employment. However, from the quoted language, the
Dinius Court seems to conclude that even if the injured worker demonstrates that the
accident occurred on employer's premises, he must also adduce evidence showing a
causal connection between the conditions existing on the employer's premises and
the accident involved. Arguably, this undermines that portion of the Foust rule
creating the presumption that an accident occurring on the employer's premises
'arises' out of employment (R. Vol. I, p. 38, LL 13-19).

Recognizing another opportunity to avoid the proper application of the Foust standard for
what proof is required to overcome the premises presumption, Employer has jumped on the
Dinius bandwagon:

The Court's holding in Foust is undermined by its subsequent decision in Dinius v.
Loving Care and More, Inc., where it stated that despite the premises presumption, a
claimant still has the burden of showing a causal connection between the conditions
existing on the employer's premises and the accident involved. (See p. 7, LL 16-19
of ER. 6.19.13 Reply Brief).
This Court should reject the Industrial Commission's and the Employer's attempts to use
the dicta from Dinius to avoid application of the Foust rule for the following reasons:
1.

The Dinius Court cited Foust with approval and did not express any intent to overrule
the Foust standards;

2.

The Dinius Court distinguished the facts in Dinius where the Claimant was injured on
her employer's premises by the acts of a third-party who was not a co-worker from
the facts in Foust where the Claimant was injured on her employer's premises by a
co-worker;

3.

The Dinius Court held that it would have been plain error for the Industrial
Commission to apply the premises presumption to the facts in Dinius since the
Industrial Commission had failed to first make the predicate finding that the
Claimant's injuries occurred on her Employer's premises;

4.

Since the Industrial Commission and the Court could not apply the premises
presumption in Dinius, the statement that the Industrial Commission and the
Employer have relied on to challenge the Foust standard was merely dicta and not
binding precedent;
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5.

The Commission based its holding that the Claimant's injury did not arise out of her
employment on the Employer's argument that the Claimant was "not subject to a
special risk incident to her employment" Dinius, supra, at 133 Idaho 572, 576, 990
P.2d 738, 742 (1999);

6.

The Court ruled that "Dinius failed to show that she was injured because of exposure
to a risk incident to her employment, see Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d
1049 (1953), or exposure to a hazard to which she would not have been exposed
outside her work environment" Id, and,

7.

Three (3) years after the Court decided Dinius, the Court specifically rejected the
greater risk, special risk, peculiar risk, exposure to a peculiar hazard arguments that
Employers were trying to import from the occupational disease theory in order to
make accident I injury claims more difficult to prove in See Spivey v. Novartis Seed,
137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002).
The Industrial Commission and the Employer have both given an interpretation to the

Dinius dicta that would nullify the premises presumption and make it essentially meaningless.
Based on this interpretation, even in those cases where the Employer has failed to come forward
with sufficient evidence to overcome the premises presumption, the presumed fact would not be
deemed to be true because the burden would then shift back to the Claimant who would have to
come forward again and present additional evidence that his injury arose out of his employment
by showing a causal connection between the conditions existing on the employer's premises and
the accident involved.
Based on the rationale of the Court's decision in Dinius, the Industrial Commission and the
Employer would like to see this Court rule that the Claimant can only show the required "causal
connection between the conditions existing on the employer's premises and the accident
involved" by showing exposure to a "special risk incident to employment" or by "exposure to a
hazard to which she would not have been exposed outside her work environment" Dinius, supra,
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at 133 Idaho 572, 576, 990 P.2d 738, 742 (1999). However, just 3 years after Dinius was
decided, this Court expressly rejected the "special risk'', "greater risk", "exposure to a peculiar
hazard" arguments in Spivey v. Novartis Seed, 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002):
The Commission determined that the record supported the decision and declined the
defendants' 'invitation to introduce risk analysis from the occupational disease legal
theory into the accident and injury legal theory.' Spivey, supra, 137 Idaho 32, 43
P.3d 791 (2002) ....
Appellants additionally urge that the Commission erred in its refusal to utilize a
greater risk analysis in this case when determining whether the respondent was
entitled to benefits .... Because her job did not place her at greater risk for injury
than her daily routine, appellants contend that there is not substantial and competent
evidence to support the Commission's findings.
The Commission's refusal to utilize a greater risk analysis in reaching its holding was
proper. The statutory language is clear on its face as to what is required of a claimant
seeking compensation for an injury sustained during an accident that arose out of and
in the course of employment. Id. 137 Idaho 34, 43 P.3d 793.
In this case, the appellants suggest a return to the rationale of Wells by requiring
Spivey to prove that her job duties placed her at a greater risk for injury than that
encountered by the general public performing the same physical motions. However,
a greater risk analysis is no longer required of a claimant in light of Mayo and
Kessler . ...
The respondent, Spivey, met her burden by establishing that she sustained an injury
that resulted from an accident that arose out of and in the course of her employment.
A greater risk analysis is not required within the context of accident/injury cases to
determine a compensable injury. Ibid, 137 Idaho 35, 43 P.3d 794.
Since this Court held in Spivey that the "greater risk" doctrine can no longer be applied in
the context of accident I injury claims, the Industrial Commission's reliance on the Dinius dicta
as a basis to overrule the Foust rule constituted plain legal error and should be reversed by this
Court on appeal.
The second assignment of error that the Claimant raised in his 5.22.13 Respondent's brief
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was that the Commission did not cite any evidence in the record to support its conclusion that
Employer had come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the premises presumption. The
Commission merely stated a bald conclusion:
Regardless, we think the question of the current status of the Foust presumption is
mooted in this case in view of our conclusion that Defendant's have come forward
with evidence sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the subject
accident is not one arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. (R.,
Vol. I, p. 38, LL 20-23).
On this pivotal issue, the Commission did cite any evidence in the record that it was
relying on to support its conclusion that Employer had come forward with sufficient evidence to
overcome the premises presumption. Without knowing what evidence the Commission based this
legal conclusion on, the Comi cannot determine if the evidence was substantial and competent.
To properly review an order of the Commission under the appropriate standard of
review, it is essential that the order of the Commission be based upon reviewable
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Iverson v. Farming, 103 Idaho 527, 530, 650
P.2d 669, 672 (1982). Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 690, 864 P.2d 132, 137 (1993).
The Court should reverse the Commission's conclusion that Employer overcame the
premises presumption because that bald conclusion was not based on substantial and competent
evidence in the record.
The 3rd assignment of error that the Claimant made to the Commission's ruling that the
Employer came forward with sufficient evidence to overcome the premises presumption was that
the Commission did not cite any legal authority to support its legal conclusion that the Employer
can overcome the premises presumption by arguing that it has a "reasonable expectation" that its
employees will pre-tie their boot laces before entering upon their Employer's premises. Since
the Commission's conclusion was not supported by any legal authority, it was plain error to
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apply this new legal standard for what is required to overcome the premises presumption and the
Court should reverse this ruling on appeal.
The

4th

assignment of error that the Claimant made to the Commission's ruling that the

Employer came forward with sufficient evidence to overcome the premises presumption was that
there was no substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Commission's
conclusion that Employer had a "reasonable expectation" that its Employees would arrive at
work with their boot laces pre-tied:
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Can you show me any written policy that UPS has that requires the worker to tie his
work boots before he arrives to work?
No. Again, that's an expectation ... (McGuire Dep, p. 49, Ll. 8-11).
Right. But in your appearance guideline that you have here which describe the
uniform, it doesn't say anything about showing up to work with your boot laces tied,
does it?
No. It shows you that you have to have the appropriate shoes, and they don't have to
have laces. They could be boots, so long as you meet those requirements. The
expectation is you would tie your shoes.
But it's an unwritten expectation?
Yes. It is a common sense expectation.(McGuire Dep, p. 50, LL 11 - 21 ).
I believe Counsel asked you a question, if UPS had any specific standards that
required it's workers to tie their shoes before they came to work. Do they?
No.
So you don't have any written policy, procedure, standard, rule or guideline that tells
Mr. Vawter he has to show up on the premises with his work boots already pre tied?
No. There is nothing written. It is a common expectation. (McGuire Dep. p. 55, L. 16
- p. 56, L. 2).
Even though the Employer micro-manages every aspect of its Employees' jobs and has

detailed appearance guidelines and footwear standards, when it comes to its boot lace tying
expectations, the Employer expects its Employees to read its mind and always arrive for work on
the Employer's premises with their boot laces pre-tied. As argued by Claimant in his 5.22.13
Response Brief, to be objectively reasonable, the Employer's expectations must be
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communicated to the employee. Sadid v. Idaho State University, 154 Idaho 88, ____ ,294
P.3d 1100, 1107 (2013).
There is no evidence in the record which proves that Employer told the Claimant in a
written policy, procedure, standard, rule or guideline that he was required to tie the laces on his
work boots before he entered upon his employer's premises. The Court should reverse the
Commission's finding that the Employer overcame the premises presumption based on its
"reasonable expectations" that the Claimant would pre-tie the laces on his work boots before
entering upon his Employer's premises because the evidence in the record proves that
Employer's expectations were not reasonable since they were never communicated to the
Employee.
The

5th

assignment of error that the Claimant made to the Commission's ruling that the

Employer came forward with sufficient evidence to overcome the premises presumption was that
the Commission did not cite any legal authority for its legal conclusion that Employer could
rebut the premises presumption by arguing that the risk which caused the Claimant's injury was
a "common risk with no particular association to the Claimant's employment".

Since the

Commission's conclusion was not supported by any legal authority, it was plain error to apply
this new legal standard to overcome the premises presumption and the Court should reverse this
ruling on appeal.
The final assignment of error that the Claimant made to the Commission's ruling that the
Employer came forward with sufficient evidence to overcome the premises presumption was that
the Commission's finding that Claimant was exposed to a "common risk with no particular
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association with Claimant's employment" was contradicted by the Commission's own
subsequent findings that were supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record:
Here, the risk of injury in question ~ connected to the employment because it was
encountered by Claimant as result of the Claimant's performance of a task that was
either part of his work, or reasonably incidental thereto (R., Vol. I, p. 45, LL 20-23).
It strains credulity to suggest that the risk of injury associated with the tying of the
shoelaces was not therefore one which followed as a natural incident of the work.
Claimant needed to have his shoes tied to perform his work, and the injury that he
suffered as a result of performing this task is assuredly connected to his employment.
This is not a case where the evidence establishes an absence of a work connection, or
where the evidence is such that it cannot be asce1iained whether Claimant's injury
was occasioned as a result of a risk personal to him versus an employment connected
risk (R., Vol. I, p. 46, LL 6-12).

However true this may be, the fact of the matter is that Claimant suffered this
particular injury as the result of his attempts to accommodate the requirements of his
job. Because Claimant was necessarily required to tie his shoelaces before starting
work, his job clearly created an actual risk which ultimately resulted in Claimant's
injury (R., Vol. I, p. 46, LL 16-20).
Even though we have found that Claimant's employment did, indeed, subject him to
an actual risk of injury due to workplace demands which required of him that his
shoelaces be tied ... (R., Vol. I, p. 47, LL 10-12).
In summary, we find that the risk of injury at issue in the instant matter is likely not a
neutral risk, but, instead, a risk of injury that bears a causal connection to the work
that Claimant was hired to perform (R., Vol. I, p. 49, LL 24-26).
The Commission committed plain legal error when it refused to apply the Foust premises
presumption standards to the facts of this case. Just 6 months after the Commission entered its
5.17.11 decision in this case, the Commission acknowledged that this Court's holding in Foust
defines the standard for what an Employer is required to prove in order to overcome the premises
presumption:
An accident involving a worker occurring on the employer's premises is presumed to
arise out of and in the course of employment. Foust v. Birds Eye Division of General
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Foods Coq~., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967). This presumption can be rebutted
by proof that the employee, while on the employer's premises, was engaged in
unforeseeable, abnormal activity foreign to his employment. Mudge v. GNP of
Idaho, Inc., and Tower Insurance Company of New York, 2011 WL 6042994, LC.
No. 2010-025109, p. 7, L. 32-p. 8, L. 1 (Filed: 11.14.11).
The Court should reverse the Commission's erroneous conclusion of law that Employer
successfully rebutted the premises presumption because that conclusion was based on the
Commission's application of the wrong legal standard and on erroneous legal conclusions that
were not supported by substantial and competent evidence or directly contradicted by the
Commission's subsequent findings.
After reversing the Commission's ruling that Employer presented sufficient evidence to
overcome the premises presumption, the Court should rule that the Claimant met his burden of
proving a compensable claim as a matter of law since Employer denied this claim on the
exclusive legal grounds that Claimant's injury did not arise out of employment and that
"presumed fact shall be deemed proved". I.R.E. 301.

4.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COMMISSION'S USE OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN ITS 12.10.12 ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION
TO PREVENT THE CLAIMANT FROM RECOVERING 100% OF ALL PAST
DENIED MEDICAL BENEFITS FROM EMPLOYER BECAUSE EMPLOYER
FAILED TO PROVE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS IN THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
FOR APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The Claimant listed 10 assignments of error in his 5.22.13 Respondent's Brief which

explained why it was plain error for the Industrial Commission to apply the doctrine of collateral
estoppel for the first time in its 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration (See pages 47-48 of
Claimant's 5.22.13 Respondent's Brief and Claimant's 12.19.12 Brief In Support of Motion For
Reconsideration of 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration at R., Vol. III, pp. 465-494). Before
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explaining how Employer failed to meet its burden of proving each of the 5 substantive elements
in the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the notice issue must first be addressed.
Employer argues that the issue of collateral estoppel was properly noticed for the 5.17 .12
Hearing because the Claimant confirmed that the parties had discussed the issues of res judicata
and I or collateral estoppel in their 2.10.12 telephone conference with the Industrial Commission
in his 2.13 .12 request to include the Idaho Code §72-719 manifest injustice issue for resolution at
the 5.17.12 Hearing (R., Vol. II, pp. 254-257) (Seep. 35, L. 19- p. 36, L. 12 of Employer's
6.19.13 Reply Brief). What Employer failed to discuss is how the complexion of the issues
changed after 2.13 .12 and Employer abandoned the collateral estoppel issue.
When the Industrial Commission entered its Notice of the 5.17.12 Hearing on 3.17.12 it
did not list collateral estoppel I issue preclusion as an issue to be heard and decided at the
5 .17 .12 hearing as required by Idaho Code §72-713.
6.

Whether Claimant is entitled to past-denied medical care benefits, or whether the
issue of Claimant's entitlement to such benefits is precluded under the doctrine of
res judicata (R., Vol. II, p. 259, LL 6-8).
At the commencement of the 5.17.12 Hearing, all of the parties explicitly agreed that

Employer had limited its affirmative defenses to res judicata and issue number 6 in the
Commission's 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing only addressed the issue ofresjudicata:
Commissioner Baskin:
The issues noticed up for today's hearing have been set forth in the Commission's notice of
hearing dated March 7, 2012, numbered one through nine. I won't go through reading all of
those issues, but would ask the parties to review that order, make sure we are all on the same
page as to whether that fairly encapsulates the issues we have talked about. Mrs. Veltman?
MRS. VELTMAN: Yes, it does.
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Mr. Augustine?
MR. AUGUSTINE: Yes, it does.
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COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Mr. Kallas?
MR. KALLAS: Yes, Your Honor, it does.
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Let me pose a couple of questions about number six, whether
claimant is entitled to past denied medical care benefits or whether the issue of claimant's
entitlement to such benefits is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. Mr. Kallas, are we
talking about additional medical bills that were incurred from the date of accident to the date of
the last hearing that you have subsequently discovered?
MR. KALLAS: Yes, Your Honor. That's Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 14 today. Those are
medical bills that were incurred by the claimant from date of injury on 12/18/09 to date of the
Industrial Commission's original decision on 4/17/11 [sic ][5.17.11].
COMMISSIONER BASKIN:
What is the approximate amount of those bills?
Approximately.
MR. KALLAS: I believe it's -- I believe it's around 24,000 dollars.
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Okay. And the issue is whether the claimant is precluded from
making a claim for those additional bills under the doctrine of res judicata. Correct, Mrs.
Veltman?
MRS. VELTMAN: That is correct. (Tr. 4/16-5/24) (emphasis supplied).
After all of the parties explicitly agreed that the doctrine of res judicata was the only
affirmative defense being raised by Employer to avoid the payment of all of the Claimant's
accident-related medical bills, mileage, per diem and lodging expenses listed in Claimant's
5.17.12 Hearing Exhibits No.'s 14, 15 and 16, the Claimant limited his legal analysis and
argument at page 25-27 in his 7.12.12 post hearing brief to the doctrine of res judicata. When
Employer filed its 8.15.12 post-hearing response brief, Employer likewise limited its argument to
res judicata at pages 24-25 and did not discuss the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Industrial
Commission rejected Employer's res judicata arguments and did not analyze or discuss the
doctrine of collateral estoppel in its 9.28.12 I 12.5.12 decision (R., Vol. III, p. 429, L. 19 - p.
432, L. 15).
Based on that record which makes it absolutely clear that the parties abandoned the
issue of collateral estopp_rl as a disputed issue for resolution at the 5.17 .12 Hearing, there was
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no substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial Commission's
"belief that by raising the doctrine of res judicata, Employer raised the issue of collateral
estoppel as well" (R., Vol. III, p. 453, LL 19-22). This finding should be reversed on appeal.
Even though the affirmative defense of res judicata was the only issue listed in the
Industrial Commission's 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing, the only affirmative defense explicitly
agreed to by the parties at the commencement of the 5.17.12 Hearing, the only affirmative
defense addressed by the Claimant in his 7.27.12 post-hearing Opening Brief, the only
affirmative defense addressed by Employer in its 8.15.12 post-hearing Reply Brief and the only
affirmative defense discussed by the Industrial Commission in its 9.28.12 I 12.5.12 decisions,
Employer asks this Court to rule that the mere listing of the collateral estoppel issue in the
Claimant's 2.13.12 request to include the Idaho Code §72-719 manifest injustice issue was
sufficient to preserve the collateral estoppel issue. The Court should reject the Employer's
argument because the mere listing of an issue which is not supported by argument or authority is
not sufficient to preserve the issue Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317,
297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (2013).
Even if the Court finds that the Claimant received adequate notice that collateral estoppel
would be a disputed issue to be heard decided at the 5.1 7.12 Hearing, the Court should still
reverse the Industrial Commission's application of collateral estoppel to the facts of this case
because Employer failed to meet it burden of proving each element in the prima facie case
for application of collateral estoppel. This Court has defined the 5 elements of collateral
estoppel as follows:

Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief

Page 29

( 1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in
the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the
issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there
was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against
whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.
Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 92, 29 P .3d at 403. This Court finds that collateral estoppel
does not bar Royal's claim seeking apportionment of liability to ISIF for Stoddard's
total and permanent disability because the issues are not identical in the two cases.
Stoddardv. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 191, 207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009).
Element No. 1:

A Full and Fair Opportunity

The Industrial Commission found that the Claimant had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the full extent of all of his_J!Mt medical benefits at the 9.28.10 Hearing

The

Commission listed 2 grounds to support that conclusion:
1.

The Claimant could have been more diligent in collecting all of his past medical
billing statements; and,

2.

The Claimant could have couched his demand differently in order to obviate his
current predicament (R., Vol. III, p. 456, LL 6-12).
The grounds cited by the Commission to suppo1i its finding that the Claimant had a full

and fair opportunity to adjudicate all of his past medical benefit claims at the 9.28.10 Hearing are
directly contradicted by the evidence in the record. The Employer's 5.12.10 Motion To Bifurcate
forced the Claimant to proceed to an expedited Hearing quickly and serve the Defendants with
his Hearing Exhibits on 9.18.10 just 59 days after his 7.21.10 lumbar fusion surgery when all of
his final medical billing statements and I or subrogation ledgers from his health insurance carrier
were not yet available:
When parties request bifurcation, they are requesting an expedited determination
of certain issues, and they should expect to be held accountable for their
responsibilities under such a determination once it is made. The policy of the
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workers' compensation law is to provide injured workers with sure and certain relief.
Claimant is correct that an important aspect of sure and certain relief is prompt
payment of benefits. (R., Vol. II, p. 211, LL 1-6) (emphasis supplied).
Employer should have anticipated that one of the risks associated with its 5.12.10 request
for an expedited Hearing would be that the Claimant would not be able to gather every single
medical bill within 59 days after his 7.21.10 lumbar fusion surgery in order to serve all of his
Hearing Exhibits on Defendants at least 10 days prior to the 9 .28 .10 Hearing as required by
J.R.P. lO(C)(l) and adjudicate all of his denied medical benefit claims at the 9.28.10 Hearing.
After Employer denied this claim on 1.8.10, the Claimant called his UPS Supervisor, Dax
Wilkinson. Mr. Wilkinson told the Claimant to process all of his denied accident-related medical
benefits through his Health Insurance Plan with the Oregon Teamsters Trust (Tr. 2, p. 90, L. 1 p. 94, L. 18). The Claimant complied with his Supervisor's instructions and processed all of his
accident-related denied medical bills through his Oregon Teamsters Trust I Blue Cross - Blue
Shield health insurance plan, but that proved to be a complicated, sometimes adversarial and
time consuming process.
The Claimant explained at the 5.17.12 Hearing that his Oregon Teamsters Trust insurance
policy had a contract provision that placed a $10,000.00 cap on the medical benefits that the
Claimant could receive if he was contesting the denial of his worker's compensation claim.
After the Claimant exceeded the $10,000.00 cap, the Oregon Teamsters Trust terminated his
medical benefits and rejected claims for the payment of further medical benefits from his
medical providers. The Claimant then had to appeal to the Board of Directors of the Oregon
Teamsters Trust and obtain a hardship waiver of the $10,000.00 cap in order to reverse the
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Board's termination of benefits and restore his eligibility to receive continuing medical benefits
(Tr. 2, p. 90, L. 15 -p. 91, L. 5; p. 106, L. 9-P. 107, L. 10).
The Claimant testified that he did not submit his medical bills to the Oregon Teamsters
Trust for processing and payment. The Claimant never saw his medical bills and just assumed
that his medical providers were sending his medical bills directly to the Oregon Teamsters Trust
for processing and payment (Tr. 2, p.91, L. 20 - p. 92, L. 3). When Employer's attorney asked
the Claimant why he did not request that his 5.17 .12 Exhibit No. 14 medical bills be paid at the
9 .28 .10 expedited I bifurcated Hearing, the Claimant testified that he did not have his most recent
bills to support a request for payment and did not know what the total amount of his bills was at
the time of the 9.28.12 expedited I bifurcated Hearing (Tr. 2, p. 103, LL 10-14).
The Claimant explained that he did not know about the $24,627.80 in past medical bills
listed in Claimant's 5.17.12 Hearing Exhibit No. 14 at the time of the expedited bifurcated
Hearing on 9.28.10 because the statement I subrogation ledger that he received from the Oregon
Teamsters I Blue Cross - Blue Shield only listed the $149,033.68 in medical bills that were
adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Claimant's Hearing Exhibit No. 7 (Tr. 2, p. 103, L. 25 - p.
104, L. 4; p. 104, LL 17-20).
The Claimant explained that he could not adjudicate the past denied medical bills listed in
Claimant's 5.17.12 Hearing Exhibit No. 14 at the 9.28.10 Hearing because the Oregon Teamsters
I Blue Cross- Blue Shield had not received the bills from his medical providers from his 7.21.10

lumbar fusion surgery or if the Oregon Teamsters had received the bills they had not yet
processed them for payment (Tr. 2, p. 104, LL 4-6). The Claimant also explained that he did not
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understand the process of how his medical providers generated their bills and submitted them to
the Oregon Teamsters Trust I Blue-Cross-Blue Shield for processing and payment.

The

Claimant testified that for all he knew, his medical providers may not have sent his bills to the
Oregon Teamsters for payment in a timely manner or, if they did, the Oregon Teamsters may
have found some kind of discrepancy or problem with the bill and sent it back to the provider for
clarification before the bill could be paid (Tr. 2, p. 104, LL 4-9).
The Claimant testified that he did not really understand the mechanics of how the medical
provider bill submission, bill processing and bill payment procedure worked between his Idaho
medical providers and Oregon Teamsters Trust I Blue Cross - Blue Shield (Tr. 2, p. 104, LL 69). However, the Claimant did know that after his Idaho medical providers submitted their bills
to Idaho Blue Cross-Blue Shield, those bills would have to be processed in Idaho first before
they were sent to the Oregon Blue Cross-Blue Shield for final processing and payment (Tr. 2, p.
104, LL 10 - 17).
The Claimant's unrefuted testimony at the 5.17.12 Hearing proves that he did not have a
full and fair opportunity to adjudicate all of his past denied bills at the 9.28.10 expedited I
bifurcated hearing because he did not know the amount of those bills at the time when his
Hearing Exhibits were due 10 days before Hearing on 9.18.10. as required by J.R.P. lO(C)(l).
This Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's finding that the Claimant had a full and
fair opportunity to adjudicate the full extent of all of his past denied medical benefit claims at the
9 .28 .10 bifurcated hearing and its finding that the Claimant should have been more diligent in
collecting all of his past denied medical benefits (R., Vol. III, p. 456, LL 6-7).
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The other ground relied on by the Commission to support its finding that the Claimant
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the full extent of all of his past denied medical benefit
claims was that the Claimant "could have couched his demand differently such as to obviate the
current predicament" (R., Vol, III, p. 456, LL 9-10). The Commission found that "in pursuing
his claim for medical benefits Claimant could have simply requested that the Commission enter
an order holding Employer responsible for all of the accident-related medical bills incurred by
Claimant to the date of hearing" (R., Vol. III, pp. 455, L. 31 - p. 456, L. 1).
What is ironic is that Claimant did exactly what the Commission chides him for not
doing. The Claimant submitted at least 3 reguests to the Commission for entry of a broad Order
based specifically on this Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206
P.3d 852 (2009) which would have required Employer to pay 100% of the invoiced amount of
ALL past medical benefits incurred by Claimant from date of injury to date when the
Commission found this claim compensable:
Request No. 1:
Based on the Supreme Court's hold [sic] [holding] in Neel, the Defendants are liable
for 100% of the invoiced amount of the medical expenses incurred by the Claimant
from the date of his 12.18.09 low back injury to the date when the Industrial
Commission enters its final and appealable order finding this claim compensable. At
the time of the September 28, 2010 Hearing, the Claimant presented undisputed
evidence proving that he has incurred at least $149,033.68 in past denied medical
bills in connection with his 12.18.09 industrial accident/ low back injury (Cl. Ex. 7)
(Tr., p. 42, L. 18 - p. 45, L. 1).
The $149,033.68 in denied past medical expenses incurred by the Claimant and
adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing may not represent 100% of all past medical
expenses incurred by the Claimant from the date of his 12.18.09 industrial accident
to the date when the Industrial Commission enters its final and appealable order
finding this claim compensable. However, the Claimant is entitled to an Order from
the Industrial Commission which sets forth the sum certain of $149,033.68 in past
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medical expenses that were presented to the Industrial Commission as Claimant's
Hearing Exhibit No. 7 and adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing so that the Claimant
can obtain an enforceable judgment pursuant to Idaho Code §72-735 upon which
interest may be calculated pursuant to Idaho Code §72-734. (Seep. 25 of Claimant's
11.19.10 post-hearing Brief) (underline supplied).

Request No. 2:
The Defendants are liable for the payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of all
past medical expenses incurred by Claimant from the date of his 12.18.09 industrial
injury to the date when the Industrial Commission enters a final and appealable order
finding this claim compensable (See p. 29 of Claimant's 11.19.10 post-hearing
Brief).
Request No. 3:
The Industrial Commission should Order the Defendants to pay 100% of the
invoiced amount of all past medical expenses incurred by Claimant from the date of
his 12.18.09 industrial injury to the date when the Industrial Commission enters a
final and appealable order finding this claim compensable in accordance with the
Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 14 7 Idaho 146, 206
P.3d 852 (2009) (Seep. 29 of the Claimant's 12.28.10 Reply Brief).
The 2 grounds that the Industrial Commission relied on to support its finding that the
Claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the full extent of all of his past denied medical
benefits at the 9.28.10 Hearing are directly contradicted by the unrefuted evidence in the record.
Since the Commission's findings were not supported by substantial and competent evidence, this
Court should reverse the Commission's full and fair opportunity finding and its application of
collateral estoppel to deprive the Claimant of the medical benefits he is entitled to pursuant to
Idaho Code §72-432 and this Court's holding in Neel.
Element No. 2:

Identical Issues

The past denied medical benefit issue before the Industrial Commission at the 9.28.10
Hearing was listed in the Commission's 7.20.10 Notice of Hearing as follows.
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3.

Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by
Idaho Code§ 72-432, and the extent thereof? (R., Vol. I, p. 18, LL 10-11).
The past denied medical benefit issue before the Industrial Commission at the 5.17 .12

Hearing was listed in the Commissions' 3.7.12 Notice of Hearing as follows:
6.

Whether Claimant is entitled to past-denied medical care benefits, or whether the
issue of Claimant's entitlement to such benefits is precluded under the doctrine of
res judicata (R., Vol. II, p. 259, LL 6-8).
Based on a plain reading of the language used by the Industrial Commission in its

Notices of Hearing, it is obvious that the medical benefit issues listed in the Industrial
Commission's Notices of Hearing were not identical as erroneously found by the Industrial
Commission in its 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration (R. Vol. III, p. 456, LL 13-17). The Court
should reverse the Commission's identical issue finding and its application of collateral estoppel.
Element No. 3: The Issue Sought To Be Precluded Was Actually Decided
The Industrial Commission erroneously found in its 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration
that it actually decided the full extent of Employer's liability for all of the Claimant's accidentrelated medical expenses at the 9.28.10 Hearing:
Likewise, it is clear that the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the
prior litigation. In the prior hearing, the Industrial Commission actually did decide
the issue of the extent of Claimant's entitlement to benefits. It is true that Claimant
has since discovered additional medial bills, but is equally clear that the issue which
the Commission decided was not limited only to those medical bills of which
Claimant was aware as of the date of hearing; the issue was the extent of Claimant's
entitlement to medical benefits. (R. Vol. III, p. 456, LL 18-23).
When the Claimant requested a sum certain of past medical benefits in his 11.19 .10 posthearing Brief, the Claimant made it very clear to the Industrial Commission he was only
requesting a sum certain of the specific past medical benefit claims that had been adjudicated at
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the 9.28.10 Hearing as Exhibit No. 7 so that he could obtain an enforceable judgment pursuant to
Idaho Code §72-735 upon which interest could accrue pursuant to Idaho Code §72-734.
A determination of liability without the determination of the amount of
compensation is not a final order. Lines v. Idaho Forest Industries, 125 Idaho 462,
464, 872 P.2d 725, 727 (1994). Hartman v. Double L Mfg., 141Idaho456, 458, 111
P.3d 141, 143 (2005).
The language of the Commission's 5.17 .11 Order proves that the Industrial Commission
understood that it did not adjudicate the full extent of all of the Claimant's past medical benefit
claims at the 9.28.10 Hearing but, rather only adjudicated Employer's liability under Neel for the
payment of 100% of the invoiced amount of the denied medical benefit claims that had been
adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Exhibit No. 7:
Claimant has incurred medical expenses totaling $149,033.68. See Claimant's
Exhibit 7 (R., Vol. I, p. 50, LL 20-21 ).
Therefore, as in Neel, we find Claimant is entitled to payment of the full
invoiced amount of$149,033.68 (R., Vol. I, p. 51, LL 2-3).
The Commission did not state in its 5.17.11 Order that by paying 100% of the invoiced
amount of the medical benefits adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Exhibit No. 7, Employer
would receive an unearned credit for paying 100% of the invoiced amount of all past medical
benefits - even those benefits that had never been adjudicated.
If the Commission had expressed this new intent in its original 5.17 .11 Order, the
Claimant would have promptly filed a Motion For Reconsideration, but there was no reason to at
the time since the Commission had merely ordered Employer to pay 100% of the invoiced
amount of all medical benefit claims that had been adjudicated as Exhibit No. 7 in accordance
with this Court's holding in Neel.

Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief

Page 37

"Since the inception of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act, Industrial Commission
proceedings have been informal and designed for simplicity; the primary purpose of
these proceedings being the attainment of justice in each individual case." Hagler v.
Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596, 599, 798 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). Industrial
Commission proceedings should be simple, accommodating to claimants, and above
all seek justice. Id. "[T]he Commission has historically been imbued with certain
powers that specifically enable it to simplify proceedings and enhance the likelihood
of equitable and just results." Id.
When a claimant has failed or overlooked submitting evidence to establish the
amount of compensation to which he is entitled, and there is no question but that he
is entitled to compensation, then it is the duty of the Board to call attention to such
failure and see to it that whatever evidence is available to establish such fact is
presented, and then make the necessary findings of fact. Watkins v. Cavanagh, 61
Idaho 720, 722, 107 P.2d 155, 157 (1940) (quoting Feuling v. Farmers' Co-operative
Ditch Co., 54 Idaho 326, 334, 31P.2d683, 686 (1934). Hartman, supra, 141 Idaho
456, 458, 111P.3d141, 143 (2005).
When the Commission surprised the Claimant with this new interpretation of its 5.7.11
Order in its 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration so that it could apply the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to deprive the Claimant of the medical benefits that he was entitled to pursuant to Idaho
Code §72-432 and this Court's holding in Neel, the Claimant promptly filed a Motion For
Reconsideration on 12.19.12 (R., Vol. III, pp. 465-494), but the Commission deprived him of the
opportunity to be heard on the subject by denying his 12.19.12 Motion For Reconsideration
without analysis or discussion (R., Vol. III, pp. 504-506).
When the Employer finally paid Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of the Exhibit 7
bills in February of 2012 (after several months of litigation and 2 failed interlocutory appeals to
the Idaho Supreme Court), Employer did not expressly state that its payment was conditioned
on the Claimant agreeing to accept Employer's payment of the Exhibit No. 7 bills in full
satisfaction of Employer's liability for the payment of ALL past denied medical benefits:
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Upon learning that the Court dismissed my interlocutory appeal by order of January
30, 2012, my client issued prompt payment to you on February 2, 2012, for the sum
of $184, 172.38. This amount includes all benefits ordered by the Industrial
Commission in its May 17, 2011 order ($149,033.68 in medical benefits and
$28,352.70 in temporary disability benefits), as well as interest from the date of the
decision through the date o f payment ($6, 786.00). Thus, all benefits ordered have
been paid. (See Claimant's 5.17.12 H.E. 017022) (emphasis supplied).
Employer did not state in its 2.14.12 letter that its 2.2.12 payment of the Exhibit No. 7
medical benefit claims would constitute full payment of 100% of ALL past medical benefits that
the Claimant incurred from the date of his 12.18.09 injury to the date when the Commission
deemed this claim compensable on 5.17 .11.
Employer did not state that by making this partial payment it expected to receive full
credit for paying I 00% of all of the Claimant's past medical benefits. By the express language in
its letter, Employer clearly understood that its 2.2.12 payment only covered "all benefits ordered
by the Industrial Commission in its May 17, 2011 order"; i.e., the medical benefit claims that
were adjudicated at the 9.28.10 Hearing as Exhibit No. 7.
Since the plain language of the Commission's 5.17.11 order made it very clear that it
only addressed the Employer's Neel liability for the payment of 100% of the past medical benefit
claims that had been adjudicated as Exhibit 7, Employer either knew or should have known that
it would only receive credit for paying those specific past medical benefit claims when it made
its unconditional payment on 2.2.12.
The Commission's finding that it decided the full extent of Employer's liability for the
payment of all of the Claimant's past medical bills in its 5.7.11 decision is not supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record. This Court should reverse this finding and the
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Commission's application of collateral estoppel to deprive the Claimant of the medical benefits
that he was entitled to pursuant to Idaho Code §72-432 and this Court's holding in Neel.
A Final Judgment on the Merits

Element No. 4:

The doctrine of collateral estoppel can only be used in those cases where the prior order
sought to be given preclusive effect is a final and appealable order. Stoddard v. Hagadone
Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 191, 207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009).

Employer filed its

1st

This is not one of those cases. When

interlocutory appeal in this case on 6.20.11, the Claimant filed a Motion

For Involuntary Dismissal with the Supreme Court based on the grounds that the Commission's
5.17.11 Order was not a final and appealable order. The Supreme Court granted Claimant's
Motion For Involuntary Dismissal on 7.27.11 (R., Vol. I, pp. 74-75).
Employer then filed a Motion For Clarification which the Supreme Court denied on
8.15.11 (R., Vol. I, p. 76). In its 8.15.11 Order dismissing Employer's appeal, the Supreme Court
specifically referred Employer to its holding in Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823
P.2d 161 (1992) and the Industrial Commission's retention of jurisdiction as evidenced by its
7 .7 .11 Amended Notice of Telephone Conference and Notice of Hearing.
This Court held recently that, "a decision of the Commission which does not finally
dispose of all of the claimant's claims would not be a final decision subject to appeal
pursuant to I.A.R. 1l(d) .... " Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co, 118 Idaho 147, 149,
795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990). Additionally, in Reynolds v. Browning Ferris Indus., 113
Idaho 965, 969, 751 P.2d 113, 117 (1988), we held that "whenever the Commission
explicitly retains jurisdiction over a matter, that act by its very nature infers that there
is neither a final determination of the case nor a final permanent award to claimant."
Jensen, supra, 121Idaho127, 127-128, 823 P.2d 161, 161-162 (1992).
By granting the Claimant's Motion For Involuntary Dismissal and denying Employer's
Motion For Clarification with specific reference to its holding in Jensen and the Commission's
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retention of jurisdiction, the Idaho Supreme Court has established the law of this case to be that
the Commission's 5.17.11 decision was !lQ1 a final and appealable order that collateral estoppel
could be applied to:
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a
case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the
decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to
throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent
appeal." Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000) Spur
Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 816, 153 P.3d 1158, 1162 (2007).
Employer has even admitted that it knew the law of this case to be that the Commission's
5.17.11 order was not a final order that would support application of collateral estoppel:
Ironically, Defendants sought to have the Commission's May 17, 2011, award
modified to reflect the lack of finality of the award, consistent with the Supreme
Court's determination that the award was not final for purposes of an appeal.
Defendants specifically pointed out that such modification, based on the theory of
manifest injustice, would allow Claimant to present additional evidence regarding
medical benefits not awarded by the initial decision (Seep. 25 of Employer's 8.15.12
Reply Brief).
Since the doctrine of collateral estoppel can only be applied against a final order which
disposes of all of the disputed issues on the merits, the Commission committed plain legal error
when it used collateral estoppel to give preclusive effect to the Commission's non-final 5.17.11
Order.
Finally, the Industrial Commission has previously held that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel should not be used in cases like this where there are multiple hearings between the same
parties:
Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in cases like this one where the litigation, albeit
including several different hearings, is nevertheless all part of the same case. Berisha
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v. The Grove Hotel and Insurance Company of the West, 2012 WL, 2118142, LC.
2002-003038 (Filed: 5.30.12)( See ~13 on p. 13).
Based on the grounds set forth above, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the Industrial Commission's use of collateral estoppel in its 12.10.12 Order and Order
Employer to pay Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of all past denied medical benefits
incurred by Claimant from date of injury on 12.18.09 to the date when the Commission found
this claim compensable on 5 .17 .11 based on this Court's holding in Neel, with proper credit for
the benefits Employer previously paid to satisfy the past medical benefit claims adjudicated at
the 9.28.10 Hearing as Claimant's Exhibit No. 7.
4.

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S
DECISION IN THIS "CLOSE CASE" TO ONLY AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES
BASED ON EMPLOYER'S UNREASONABLE REFUSAL TO PAY CLAIMANT
HIS UNDISPUTED PPI BENEFITS AND AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES AT
EVERY STAGE OF THIS CLAIM
Employer denied this claim on the exclusive legal ground that the Claimant's low back

mJury did not arise out of his employment. The Claimant asked Employer to reverse its
unreasonable denial because the Claimant was injured on his Employer's premises which gave
rise to a presumption that his injury arose out of employment. The Claimant asked Employer to
share any facts that would overcome this presumption, but Employer failed to present any
evidence to rebut the presumption.

The Claimant reminded Employer that all doubts over

whether in injury arises out of employment, must be resolved in the Claimant's favor. Employer
ignored the Claimant's arguments and persisted in its unreasonable denial.
The Claimant was forced to file a Complaint with the Industrial Commission and litigate
all disputed issues to 2 Hearings before the Industrial Commission and 3 appeals to this Court.
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Although the Commission characterized the attorney's fee issue as a "close call", the
Commission did not award attorney's fees to Claimant in its 5.17.11 Order or its 12.8.11 Order.
The Claimant explained in his 5.22.13 Respondent's Brief why this Court should reverse the
Commission's denial of Claimant's request for attorney's fees and identified the specific
assignments of error made by the Commission when it ruled against the Claimant on the
attorney's fee issue (See pp. 51-58 of Claimant's 5.22.13 Respondent's Brief).
Employer did not address the Claimant's assignments of error on the attorney fee issue in
its 6.19.13 Reply Brief but focused both of its arguments on the Commission's decision to award
Claimant attorney's fees in its 12.5.12 Order and its 12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration. The
first argument made by Employer is that the Industrial Commission erred by awarding attorney's
fees because it had previously stated in its 12.8.11 Order Denying Stay that it would not revisit
any of the issues decided in the 5.17.11 decision (Seep. 38, LI. 3-5 of Employer's 6.19.13 Reply
Brief). Employer has taken the Industrial Commission's statement out of context.
Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, the May 17, 2011 decision is final
as to the matters of whether Claimant suffered an injury arising out of employment,
whether Claimant is entitled to TTD benefits, whether Claimant is entitled to medical
benefits, and whether Claimant is entitled to attorney's fees. These issues will not be
revisited by the Commission in future decisions, absent instruction by the Court
following appeal (R., Vol. II, p. 208, LI. 12-17).
The Commission simply meant that it would not consider another request for attorney's
fees for any of Employer's unreasonable conduct that occurred prior to the date of the
Commission's 5.17.11 compensability decision because the Commission had already adjudicated
the Claimant's right to attorney's fees during that stage of the case in its 5.17.11 decision.
Employer's argument that the Commission's 12.8.11 Order Denying Stay gives the Employer
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prophylactic protection from all future awards of attorney's fees is clearly erroneous since the
Commission does not have authority to issue prophylactic orders that bar an award of attorney's
fees based on future unreasonable conduct that has not even happened.
Employer next argues that it had no obligation to pay the Claimant his undisputed 12%
whole person PPI rating because it has always disputed the issue of causation. This argument is
directly contradicted by the evidence in the record which conclusively proves that Employer has
never challenged causation in this case:

The Industrial Commission asserted that following the Supreme Court's Order
Denying Permissive Appeal, UPS should have paid Respondent the portion of
impairment (12%) that Dr. Frizzell opined was related to his 2009 injury. This,
despite the fact that UPS continued to dispute the issue of causation and Respondent
had not proven his entitlement to such benefits. Dr. Frizzells' rating was disputed by
virtue of the fact that causation was disputed ... (See p. 39, LL 4-9 of Employer's
6.19 .13 Reply Brief).
Employer misstates the evidence in the record. Employer has never disputed the issue of
causation. Employer only has only disputed the issue of apportionment of permanent physical
impairment (PPI) benefits; i.e., what percentage of Claimant's 3.10.11 19% whole person PPI
rating should be "apportioned" to Claimant's 10.22.90 low back injury so that Employer could
attempt to shift liability to the ISIF.
The Claimant's attending physicians are the only medical experts in this case who have
issued medical causation opinions. Employer did not hire any Independent Medical Experts
(IME) to address the causation issue. On 1.14.10, the Claimant's attending physician, Scott S.
Harris, M.D., of Payette Lakes Medical Center, opined that the Claimant's 12.18.09 bending over
to tie the laces on his work boots accident caused his low back injury (CL. 9.28.10 EX. 2,
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002003). On 2.6.10, the Claimant's attending neurological surgeon, R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D.,
opined that the Claimant's 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work boots accident caused his L4-5
disc herniations and bulges. Dr. Frizzelll also opined that Claimant required urgent back surgery
on 1.20.10 due to his early cauda equina syndrome (CL. 9.28.10. EX. 3, 003040).
On 2.23.10, Dr. Frizzell reiterated his opinion that the Claimant's 12.18.09 back injury at
UPS caused his L4-5 disc herniation and resulted in the need for his 1.20.10 L4-5 discectomy and
laminectomy (CL. 9.28.10 EX. 3, 003042). On 7.21.10, Dr. Frizzell reiterated his opinion that
that the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident had caused the Claimant's L4-5 disc herniation and cauda
equina symptoms and resulted in the need for his 1.20.10 L4-5 discectomy and laminectomy (CL.
9.28.10 EX. 3, 003054).
On 8.19.10, Dr. Frizzell opined that the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident caused the
need for the Claimant's 7.21.10 second back surgery; i.e., decompression for recurrent disc
herniation and L4-5 lumbar fusion (CL. 9.28.10 EX. 3, 003059).

On 9.16.10, Dr. Frizzell

reiterated that the need for the Claimant's second back surgery on 7.21.10 was caused by his
12.18.09 industrial accident (CL. 9.28.10 EX. 3, 003062).
Employer did not dispute the causal relationship between the Claimant's 12.18.09
industrial accident and his need for 2 back surgeries when it denied this claim on 1.8.10 and
2.26.10 (CL. 9.28.10 EX. 8 and EX. 9, 009006). The Industrial Commission held that "there is no
dispute that Claimant's injuries are causally related to the accident" (R., Vol. I, p. 39, LI. 17-18).
Although Employer argues in its 6.19 .13 brief that it has always challenged causation, that
is simply not true. Likewise, Employer never challenged Dr. Frizzell's decision to apportion 7%
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of the Claimant's 3.10.11 19% whole person PPI rating to the Claimant's 10.22.90 low back
injury which left an undisputed 12% whole person PPI rating due specifically to the Claimant's
12.18.09 industrial accident (Cl. 5.17.12 EX. 1, 001101). In fact it would have been strange if
Employer had challenged that apportionment opinion since it was Employer who asked Dr.
Frizzell to apportion some percentage of Claimant's 19% whole person PPI rating to his 10.22.90
low back injury so that it could transfer liability to the ISIF (CL. 5.17.12 EX I, 001099-001100).
The Industrial Commission awarded the Claimant attorney's fees in its 12.5.10 Order and
12.10.12 Order On Reconsideration because the Employer asked Dr. Frizzell for an
apportionment opinion on 3.7.11, received Dr. Frizzell's undisputed 12% I 7% apportionment
opinion on 3.10.11, did not hire any IME medical expert to challenge or dispute that
apportionment opinion, but still refused to pay Claimant the undisputed 12% PPI rating that Dr.

Frizzell assigned to the 12.18.09 injury in spite of receiving multiple demands for payment from
Claimant (CL. 5.17.12 EX. 17). The Court should affirm the Commission's 12.5.12 and 12.10.12
Orders awarding fees.
The Employer has always argued throughout these proceedings that it does not have any
obligation to pay the Claimant any of the worker's compensation benefits that he is entitled to
receive under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act (in spite of the Commission's 5.17.11
compensability decision) until after this Court enters a final decision on appeal. The Industrial
Commission explained why that defense to the non-payment of benefits was unreasonable in its
12.8.11 decision and its 12.5.12 decision:
As noted above, the Commission's final order on the issue of compensability brings
with it an obligation to pay to Claimant those workers' compensation benefits to

Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant's Reply Brief

Page 46

which he would normally be entitled as a result of having suffered a compensable
accident/injury" (R., Vol. III, p. 435, LL 7-10).
What Employer/Surety has failed to understand, however, is that the Commission's
finding that the subject accident is compensable carries with it an obligation on the
part of Employer/Surety to pay to Claimant those workers' [sic][worker's]
compensation benefits to which he is entitled as a result of the accident. We find
nothing in the correspondence going back and forth between Claimant's counsel and
Defense Counsel which suggests that Employer/Surety at any time disputed the
claims for additional benefits to which Claimant believed he was entitled. The only
basis for denial was the aforementioned belief that Employer/Surety had no
obligation under the May 17, 2011 order to pay anything except those benefits which
were specifically addressed in that order.
As explained in more detail in our December 8, 2011 order denying Employer's
motion for stay, it is the expectation of the Industrial Commission that its final order
on compensability binds the parties to act accordingly during the pendency of this
bifurcated matter. It is no defense to Claimant's manifold requests to simply say that
Claimant's entitlement to the benefits at issue will be decided in connection with the
May 17, 2012 hearing. Absent a good faith dispute over Claimant's entitlement to a
particular benefit, Employer/Surety had an obligation to timely pay the same once
this claim had been found to be compensable under the workers' compensation laws
of this state. (See Idaho Code§ 72-304) (R., Vol. III, p. 438, LL 2-18).
Based on all of the evidence in the record and all of the attorney's fees arguments that
Claimant has made in all briefs filed with the Industrial Commission and this Court, the Claimant
respectfully requests an Order from this Court which awards the Claimant attorney's fees at
every stage of the litigation from date of injury on 12.18.09 to the date of final decision on
appeal and on remand to the Commission if a remand becomes necessary pursuant to Idaho Code
§72-804 and this Court's holding in Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d
288 (2008).
CONCLUSION

Based on record and briefs before the Industrial Commission and the briefs filed with the
Supreme Court, The Claimant respectfully requests that this Court enter the following Orders on
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appeal:
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

12.
13.

14.

15.

An Order affirming the Commission's 5.17.11 "arose out of' employment ruling and
award of past denied medical benefits and retroactive total temporary disability benefits;
An Order reversing the Commission's 5.17.11 decision that Employer came forward with
sufficient evidence to rebut the premises presumption;
An Order ruling that Claimant was entitled to a favorable ruling on the arose out
employment issue as a matter of law based on the proper application of the premises
presumption to the unique facts of this case because Employer only denied this claim on
the exclusive legal grounds that Claimant's accident and injury did not arise out of
employment;
An Order reversing the Commission's 5.17.11 decision to not award the Claimant
attorney's fees;
An Order instructing Employer that it had a duty to comply with the Industrial
Commission's Orders even if they were not final and appealable Orders and explaining the
consequences of its failure to do so;
An Order reversing the Commission's 12.8.11 decision to not award the Claimant
attorney's fees;
An Order affirming the Claimant's 19% whole person PPI rating and assigning 100% of
that rating to the Claimant's 12.18.09 injury;
An Order reversing the Commission's 12.5.12 decision to apportion 7% of the Claimant's
19% PPI rating to the Claimant's 10.22.90 injury;
An Order reversing the Commission's 12.5.12 decision that Claimant's 10.22.90 7%
impairment was a subjective hindrance to employment prior to his 12.18.09 injury;
An Order reversing the Commission's 12.5.12 decision that Claimant's 10.22.90 7%
impairment combined with Claimant's 12.18.09 injury to cause total and permanent
disability;
An Order affirming the Industrial Commission's 12.5.12 decision that quasi-estoppel
prevents Employer from shifting any liability for Claimant's total and permanent disability
to the ISIF;
An Order affirming the Industrial Commission's 12.5.12 decision to award the Claimant
attorney's fees;
An Order reversing the Industrial Commission's 12.10.12 decision to use collateral
estoppel to give Employer an unearned credit for the payment of past denied benefits that
Employer never actually paid;
An Order reversing the Commission's 12.10.12 decision to use collateral estoppel to
limit its award of attorney's fees to Employer's unreasonable refusal to pay Claimant his
undisputed 12% PPI award; and
An Order awarding Claimant attorney's fees based on the percentages set forth in his
Legal Services Contingency Fee Employment Agreement at every stage of this litigation
from date of injury to date of final decision on appeal and on remand.
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Respectfully submitted this 10th day of July, 2013.
Ellsworth, Kallas, & Defranco, PLLC

Rick D. Kallas of the firm
Attorney For Claimant I Respondent I Cross-Appellant
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